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For many years managers were able to make business decisions
having regard only to company profit and shareholder contribution
but in recent years they have had to consider a much wider range
of issues and values. To the extent that OR is essentially an aid to
management decision-making it too has to share these perspec-
tives. Recent global events such as the threat of environmental
disaster, corporate dishonesty, the credit crunch and the rise of
ethical consumerism mean that the ethical implications of man-
agement actions have also come to be more recognised. This is
reflected in the OR literature where there has been a resurgence
of interest in ethics and OR (Brans, 2002; Brocklesby, 2009; Gallo,
2004; Kunsch et al., 2007; Le Menestrel and Van Wassenhove,
2004; White, 2008). In the main, papers fall into three camps: (i)
those concerned with OR as a profession, for example codes of
ethics and the effects of ethical committees; (ii) those concerned
with OR modelling and the extent to which ethical concerns can
or should be incorporated within mathematical and systems
models; and (iii) those concerned more widely with the effects of
management decisions, and thus OR practice, on society and the
environment.
However, within this literature there is relatively little
consideration of existing ethical theories and how these might be
relevant to OR. This paper will consider a particular, innovative,
approach to ethics known as ‘‘discourse ethics’’, developed byll rights reserved.
. Ethics and OR: OperationalisHabermas (1992b, 1993b) and important in the world of politics
as underpinning the notion of ‘‘deliberative democracy’’.
The first section will briefly review the main ethical theories in
order to contextualise discourse ethics and then review the litera-
ture within OR. The next section will explain discourse ethics high-
lighting its strengths and weaknesses. One weakness is that it is
overly abstract and idealistic, and it is here that OR methods, both
hard and soft, can contribute to operationalising it. This will be
developed in the third section.
2. Ethical theories in philosophy and OR
2.1. Philosophical ethics
Ethics has been an abiding question within philosophy going
back to the Greeks and beyond. In more modern times, Kant is seen
as the major figure and other theories can best be described in
terms of their relationship to Kantian deontology (coming from
the Greek for duty). I will outline what are seen as the three major
positions within ethics – first, utilitarianism/consequentialism,
second, deontology and third, virtue ethics and communitarianism
(Baron et al., 1997; LaFollette, 2007; Singer, 1993). As we shall see,
discourse ethics encompasses elements of all three.
One of the principal distinctions is whether an act should be
judged as an act in itself or in terms of its effects and consequences.
Consequentialists such as Hume (1967 (orig. 1750)) and Smith
(2002 (orig. 1759)) held that proper actions are those that do the
greatest overall good or the least overall harm. This was developed
as utilitarianism by social reformers such as Bentham (1948 (orig.
1789)), who wanted to displace traditional duties and religiousing discourse ethics. European Journal of Operational Research (2010),
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Thus ‘‘good’’ actions are those that bring about the most good for
the most people. It seems to fit squarely with the philosophy of
OR with one significant difference. OR’s main principle is to evalu-
ate different courses of action in terms of their effects or conse-
quences and to choose the best, but the difference is that it does
so not in the interests of all but only in the interests of the client
or decision-maker.
Kant (1991 (orig. 1785)) developed his own theory in direct re-
sponse to the utilitarians. Actions should be seen as morally right
or wrong, just or unjust, in themselves regardless of their conse-
quences or the extent to which they benefit particular people. He
developed a principle, the ‘‘categorical imperative’’ that should
be followed by all people at all times. The underlying argument
for this is that most actions are done to achieve a purpose – they
are means to an end, and it is the end that is valued. However, peo-
ple may value different ends or objectives differently so can there
be an universal end? Kant’s answer was that there could be – hu-
man beings in themselves. It is rational human beings who make
value judgments and so we need to treat other humans as equal
to ourselves, as ends and not means. He formulated this in several
ways:
‘‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same
time will that it should become a universal law’’ (Kant, 1991
(orig. 1785), p. 97).
‘‘Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in
your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a
means, but always at the same time as an end’’ (Kant, 1991
(orig. 1785), p. 106).
So there are two primary aspects to the categorical imperative:
that moral behaviour always involves treating people equally as
ends in themselves, never as means to an end; and that action
maxims should be those that can apply universally. We shall see
both of these ideas being embodied in discourse ethics, although
in a very different way. We can see immediately that this does
not actually fit very well with, at least traditional, OR. The OR mod-
elling approach, driven by the objectives of the client, has a ten-
dency to treat people, ‘‘human resources’’, very much as any
other type of resource – a means to an overall end. The workforce,
for example, is often just another variable in a mathematical
model.
Whilst Kant’s theory was quite individualistic – it is the individ-
ual, rational subject who has to make these choices, the other two
main approaches within the deontological tradition are based on
the idea of a social contract rather than individual acts. This is clo-
ser to discourse ethics which expects to operate at the level of the
society or group. Locke (1980 (orig. 1689)) based his approach on
the idea of a set of natural human rights that society should en-
shrine, and this was influential in constructing the American Con-
stitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. More
recently, Rawls (1971) introduced the idea of a ‘‘veil of ignorance’’
in determining an appropriate set of social rules. Suppose that you
knew nothing about your own personal characteristics (e.g., gen-
der, race, disability) or position (e.g., wealth, class) in a society. If
you were then asked to decide on the rules for that society, surely
you would choose a set of rules that were equally fair to all so that
you would not be disadvantaged whatever situation you found
yourself in. This is quite an attractive idea, and there has been con-
siderable debate between Habermas and Rawls (Habermas, 1996).
These social contract principles can be seen to underlie the idea of
codes of practice for professional societies.
The third major strand of ethical theory dates back to Aristotle
(2000) but has been developed in recent time by MacIntyre (1985),
known as virtue ethics or communitarianism. Aristotle was not
concerned with the consequences of acts, or dutiful acts inPlease cite this article in press as: Mingers, J. Ethics and OR: Operationalis
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behaving. He argued that people should develop emotions, person-
ality and moral habits such that they ‘‘naturally’’ behaved in a way
that led to the well-being of the individual and the wider society.
These ideas about what constitutes a virtuous and good life have
been taken up by MacIntyre as a reaction to the a-historical indi-
vidualism assumed by the deontologists, especially Rawls. Macin-
tyre argues that we only become socialized as human beings
through our development within a particular community and that
we inevitably take on the codes and values of that community. This
means that values and practices always remain relative to a partic-
ular community and there can be no external standpoint from
which to judge them. Whilst we can see that there certainly must
be some truth in this argument, it leads to difficulties in arbitrating
between conflicting cultural systems as is very much the case in
the world today (Habermas, 2001).
2.2. Ethics and OR
Even though OR is devoted to trying to tell us (or at least man-
agers) what they ‘‘ought’’ to do, which is after all the fundamental
question of ethics, there has been relatively little discussion of eth-
ical questions within the OR literature (Brans and Gallo, 2007). Cer-
tainly the founders of OR, e.g., Blackett, Gordon, Churchman or
Ackoff, were very aware that OR had ethical implications. Indeed,
for them OR was very much about bringing improvements to soci-
ety not merely making more profit for companies (Rosenhead,
1989). Churchman (1970, 1971, 1994) has always argued that we
need to consider the effects of our actions and decisions on the
whole system of which they are only a part (Ulrich, 1994a) and
that managing well means managing ethically, and Boulding
(1966) also discussed the importance of ethics for OR.
There have been some attempts to set up professional ethical
guidelines to govern practitioners’ activity from a deontological
perspective. In 1971, the Operations Research Society of America
(ORSA) did publish just such a set in the journal Operations Re-
search (Caywood et al., 1971). This was followed up in 1983 by a
report from the ORSA Ethics Committee (Kettelle, 1983) proposing
both guidelines and a specific ethical code. However, neither were
adopted by ORSA and in fact no OR society in the world apart from
the Japanese has one (Gass, 2009). It is interesting to speculate why
operational researchers have been so reluctant to regulate our-
selves in this way when most other professional societies do so
(Oz, 1992; Rosenberg, 1998). In any case, we may not be able to
do so much longer because of the increasing importance of Re-
search Ethics Committees in regulating university research (White,
2008), although this approach does not fit well with discourse
ethics.
There have been two significant debates within the literature.
The first was sparked by Ackoff’s discussion of the social responsi-
bility of OR (Ackoff, 1974; Chesterton et al., 1975; Rosenhead,
1976). The debate is interesting as it surfaces some fundamental is-
sues. Ackoff argued that, as a profession, OR has a duty to consider
not only the interests of those involved in decision-making but also
all other stakeholders who are affected by a decision, very much in
line with discourse ethics as we shall see. He also argued that OR
should offer assistance to those who cannot afford it, an aim even-
tually partially realised by the development of community OR (for
and on behalf of groups who could not pay) in the UK (Midgley and
Ochoa-Arias, 2004; Parry and Mingers, 1990).
The debate was not with Ackoff’s first point, as might have been
expected – i.e., that OR does not have any duty to stakeholders be-
yond the immediate client – but rather with Ackoff’s further claim
that it would generally be possible to find solutions that would sat-
isfy all parties – i.e., that there were no fundamental and irrecon-
cilable differences of interest between, say, managers anding discourse ethics. European Journal of Operational Research (2010),
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analysis of OR from a Marxist perspective which showed the extent
to which it had moved away from any form of concern for social
improvement.
The second debate was a generalisation of the previous critique
in that Jackson (1982, 1983) argued that soft OR/systems methods
could never bring about radical change in a social or political sense
since they would always reflect the views and interests of those
using them, i.e., those in power. Ackoff (1982), Churchman
(1982), and Checkland (1982) all responded arguing, in different
ways, that one could not pre-judge the outcome of an intervention
and that it was possible in principle for radical changes to occur.
This debate was part of the development of the Critical Systems
Thinking (CST) movement (Jackson, 1985, 1991b; Mingers,
1992a), drawing on the work of Habermas (1974, 1978). CST recog-
nised different forms of knowledge – technical (hard), practical
(soft) and critical. It also explicitly embodied an ethical or emanci-
patory commitment (Jackson, 1991a). Habermas’s work on ethics
will be the subject of much of the rest of the paper.
More recent work has focussed on how OR can actually help
with the major social and environmental issues that we face, and
on incorporating ethical concerns in OR practice. The former direc-
tion points out the extent to which the world now faces serious
systemic problems in producing a sustainable future in terms of
destruction of the climate and environment, depletion of natural
resources, and excessive greed and short-term profiteering. The
argument is that OR is in a strong position to help make beneficial
choices both through its general approach, and some of its specific
tools. Brans and Gallo (2007) emphasise the importance of sys-
temic thinking as an approach, and system dynamics as a tool. It
is not hard to see that the world’s problems are inextricably linked
and cannot be dealt with reductionistically. A classic example that,
it is claimed, has led to the collapse of civilizations such as the
Maya is the ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ where a plentiful resource
available to all is exploited until it is available to none (Diamond,
2005; Ostrom, 2009; Senge, 1990). Another example is the ‘‘tipping
point’’ where many small changes generate a state change, pushing
a system over the edge (Gladwell, 2001; Rockstrom et al., 2009).
These can be easily modelled with system dynamics.
Brans (2002) champions the importance of Multicriteria
Decision Analysis (MCDA) as a means of trying to balance the
competing values and demands that complex social and economic
problems always involve, a particular instance being PROMETHEE-
GAIA (Brans and Mareschal, 1994). It is also beneficial to combine
together MCDA with systems dynamics, e.g., in CO2 emissions
control (Kunsch et al., 2004). A more comprehensive methodology
for handling complex societal problems (COPRAM) has been
developed by DeTombe (2001, 2002). This involves combinations
of hard and soft OR methods within a multi-actor and stakeholder
setting.
The latter stream revolves around the extent to which OR
practice, and particularly OR models, can or should reflect ethical
issues. This was initially debated in a workshop in 1989 resulting
in a book on ethics in modelling (Wallace, 1994). Many of the con-
tributors held to the view that modelling should aspire to be an
objective process, akin to natural science modelling, and that eth-
ical issues should be excluded frommodels except those pertaining
to the process of modelling itself, i.e., that it be rigorous, explicit
and unbiased. This is a view of modelling that Le Menestrel and
Van Wassenhove (2004) call ‘‘ethics outside the model’’. However,
many people would deny that the social and organisational world
is in fact the same as the natural world. Rather, it is inherently va-
lue-laden and any model of it will reflect a variety of values of the
modeller, the client, and perhaps the organisation (Brans, 2002;
Brans and Gallo, 2007; Gallo, 2004; Mingers, 1980; Rosenhead,
1987).Please cite this article in press as: Mingers, J. Ethics and OR: Operationalis
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ove call ‘‘ethics within models’’ where ethical concerns are explic-
itly brought into the model. An example is Brans (2002), who
suggests adding additional constraints or additional objectives or
weights to reflect social concerns. This, however, raises many is-
sues such as where the weights come from?Who would determine
them? And, the extent to which they could be used to legitimise
particular interests. As a result, Le Menestrel and Van Wassenhove
recommend ‘‘ethics beyond the model’’. By this they mean seeing
the model, and the processes that lead to it, as being just a part
of a wider communicative debate between the involved parties.
‘‘In a sense, we are trying to build on communicational ethics as
a bridge between the theoretical and practical dimensions of
human behaviour (Habermas, 1990)’’ (Le Menestrel and Van
Wassenhove, 2004, p. 483).
This is a very interesting approach as it moves ethical responsi-
bility firmly into the hands of those engaged in the project, and the
social context and practices in which they are embedded. Whilst it
is easy to say this, it is not easy to do as Brocklesby (2009) has illus-
trated and is a point we will return to later in the paper. Ulrich
(2007) has also pointed to the potential relevance of discourse eth-
ics although ultimately arguing that it is too impractical (Ulrich,
2006). Wenstøp and Koppang (2009) consider the problem of com-
peting or conflicting values in OR. Their interesting paper high-
lights both the role of emotions in decision-making, in some
ways antithetical to the rationalism of OR, and the potential of dis-
course ethics for approaching value conflict in a more rational way.
This is a move back in the direction suggested by Ackoff to-
wards recognising a much wider range of stakeholders to an OR
project than just the client or decision maker. Rosenhead (1994)
argued this in his contribution to the ethics in modelling book
mentioned above; Gallo (2004, p. 471), proposes the responsibility
principle: ‘‘responsibility towards the other (the value), be it
humankind (past, present and future generations) or nature’’; Koch
(2000) reminds us that we are citizens first and only modellers sec-
ond; and Theys and Kunsch (2004) emphasise the importance of
co-operative behaviour between all stakeholders in order to man-
age ethically and ensure a long-term sustainable future.
To summarise, recent interest in ethics has both suggested that
OR has a special role to play in helping us deal with complex envi-
ronmental and social problems, and argued that within OR projects
ethical concerns cannot simply be inserted into models but need to
be dealt with as part of wider discourses between involved stake-
holders. We will take up both of these themes in discussing the
contribution of discourse ethics in the next section.
3. Discourse ethics
Jürgen Habermas is a major sociologist and philosopher whose
work has been influential within the management literature. His
early theory (of knowledge-constitutive interests – KCI) was pri-
marily epistemological, concerning human interests in different
forms of knowledge and their corresponding methodologies (Hab-
ermas, 1978). The first, called the technical interest, was in being
able to control and transform the physical world. This underwrites
the natural or empirical sciences. But humans also have the ability
to communicate through language and this enables them to co-
ordinate their actions and agree on modes of behaviour. This leads
to the practical interest in communication and understanding that
governs the social world. Finally, he argued that we also have an
emancipatory interest in our own self-development and freedom
from false ideas that underpins what he called critical science.
From this, developed his Theory of Communicative Action (TCA)
(Habermas, 1984, 1987) which argued that language, communica-ing discourse ethics. European Journal of Operational Research (2010),
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tional discourse and debate rests on making and challenging valid-
ity claims concerning states of affairs in the material world (truth);
valid norms of behaviour in our social world (rightness); and inten-
tions and beliefs in my personal world (truthfulness or sincerity).
Along with the TCA, and drawing on prior work by Apel (1980),
Habermas developed theoretical conceptions of discourse ethics
(Habermas, 1992b, 1993b), law (Habermas, 1996) and deliberative
democracy (Habermas, 1999b, 2001). This work is both highly sys-
tematic, and aspires to be of practical relevance. It brings in several
of the ethical approaches discussed above, and also has a discursive
dimension that resonates with developments in soft OR. For all
these reasons, it is valuable to consider its relevance to ethics in OR.
Habermas’s extensive theoretical work, generally prior to Dis-
course Ethics (DE), has been taken up in many ways within both
OR/MS and management theory more generally. We will briefly re-
view its history within OR before moving to DE.
Mingers (1980) was perhaps the first paper to draw attention to
Habermas, comparing his early work on the relations between the-
ory and practice (Habermas, 1971, 1974) with Checkland’s newly
developing systems approach called Soft Systems Methodology
(SSM) (Checkland, 1981). A further paper (Mingers, 1984) critiqued
the subjectivism inherent in SSM from a critical theory perspective.
At the same time, Werner Ulrich had been extensively studying
Habermas’ work as well as that of C. West Churchman. This re-
sulted in a major book (Ulrich, 1983) called ‘‘Critical Heuristics of
Social Planning’’ which provided a method (Critical Systems Heu-
ristics – CSH) for challenging the boundary judgements, made by
planners and designers, that determine the facts and values incor-
porated in systems designs (Ulrich, 1991).
Jackson (1985, 1989), and later Flood and Jackson (1991), used
the theory of knowledge constitutive interests to develop a meta-
methodology for choosing between different management science
approaches – traditional, hard mathematical modelling, soft sys-
tems type approaches, and critical approaches such as CSH. This
became know as Critical Systems Thinking (CST) or the Critical Sys-
tems Approach (CSA) and was also developed, in different direc-
tions, by Mingers (1992a,b) and Midgley (1989, 1995).
Habermas’ later theory of communicative action, which re-
placed KCI, was also utilised (Midgley, 1992; Mingers, 1997b,
2003). By the 2000’s critical systems was well established with
important books by Jackson (2000, 2003c), Midgley (2000), Flood
and Romm (1996) and Mingers (2006). There were also heated de-
bates around issues such as the relationship between CSH and CST
(Jackson, 2003a; Mingers, 2005b; Ulrich, 2003); the relationship
between CST and multimethodology (Jackson, 2003b); and the
relations between CST, OR practice and pragmatism (Mingers,
2005a; Ormerod, 2004; Ulrich, 2004).
3.1. The pragmatic, the ethical and the moral
Discourse ethics (somewhat inappropriately named) beginswith
thequestion,mentionedabove, ‘‘what oughtwedo?’’Habermas sug-
gests that this question can occur with respect to three different
kinds of problematic situation – pragmatic, ethical and moral.
‘‘Thus, the question ‘What should I do?’ takes on a pragmatic, an
ethical, or a moral meaning depending on how the problem is
conceived. In each case it is a matter of justifying choices among
alternative available courses of action, but pragmatic tasks call
for a different kind of action, and the corresponding question a
different kind of answer, from ethical or moral ones’’ (Haber-
mas, 1993a, p. 8, orig. emphasis).Pragmatic problems are those concerned with finding an appro-
priate means to a well-defined end. How can we get the productionPlease cite this article in press as: Mingers, J. Ethics and OR: Operationalis
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goods? They often concern the material world rather than the so-
cial or personal ones and may well be complicated, requiring
knowledge and resources to resolve. The main criterion for success
is efficacy – does the proposed solution work? In terms of ethical
theory this is consequentialist as it judges an act in terms of its
consequences but in distinction to utilitarianism it does not seek
the greatest good for the greatest number but the greatest good
for the interests of the client.
Often, however, problematic issues raise questions beyond
merely the efficacious. There may be disagreement or uncertainty
about appropriate objectives and goals, or about possible means of
achieving them. Here we are concerned with strong values (Taylor,
1989) that people or groups may hold about how one should live a
‘‘good’’ life. This is where ethical questions enter. Should we be
concerned about the effects of our actions on others? Should we al-
ways tell the truth? Is it ever right to give or accept bribes? What
responsibilities do we have towards animals or the environment?
These issues generally relate to the personal world of an individual
or the social world of a group. The criterion is not efficacy but good-
ness or virtue and so it echoes the concerns of Aristotelianism or
virtue ethics.
For Habermas, the answers to ethical issues may be different for
different people or groups. We may legitimately disagree about
what constitutes the good life. Religions, cultures, and individuals
may come to different answers about questions such as vegetarian-
ism or scrupulous honesty. But, are there are not some issues that
affect everyone in such a way that they transcend the interests of
particular groups and concern matters of equity or justice for all?
This is the heart of the Kantian claim to universalization. If we
do not accept that there are at least some universal moral norms,
then we lose the capacity to ever criticise practices that contradict
basic ideas of human rights and freedoms, and we open the way for
inter-cultural conflict and authoritarianism in all its forms.
These issues Habermas refers to as moral questions and they
necessitate going beyond the interest of the few to the interests
of all.
‘‘We should not expect a generally valid answer when we ask
what is good for me, or good for us, or good for them; we must
rather ask: what is equally good for all? This ‘moral point of
view’ constitutes a sharp but narrow spotlight, which selects
from the mass of evaluative questions those action-related con-
flicts which can be resolved with reference to a generalizable
interest; these are questions of justice’’ (Habermas, 1992a, p.
248).And it is these moral issues that are actually the main focus of
discourse ethics, despite it name. Some examples of such norms
might be: the right of the individual to exercise basic freedoms
which requires both others to respect these choices, and in turn,
the individual to respect others’ choices; the right to be given a fair
wage for ones’ labour; or the right not to be treated in a racialist
way.
3.2. Discourse
The approach is clearly Kantian in its concern with universalis-
ability but it is wholly novel in putting forward a process based not
on the individual subject and their conscience but on practical de-
bate and discourse between all those who might be affected. Hab-
ermas begins with the fundamental question of whether there are
moral truths, or put in his terms, whether there are norms of action
that can be universal, i.e., accepted by all, and, if so, how can these
by justified? Habermas draws an analogy with the idea of truth in
empirical science but we need to note that for Habermas truth,ing discourse ethics. European Journal of Operational Research (2010),
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Peirce (1931–1958) and Mead (1934) in seeing truth as that which
would emerge from an unlimited debate among a community of
enquirers.
In theoretical (i.e., empirical) science we have particular facts or
observations and from these develop generalised laws which may
be said to have some degree of ‘‘truth’’. To go from one to the other
we need bridging principles such as induction or falsification
which warrants the validity of the generalised law. In the moral
domain we need a similar bridging principle or ‘‘moral principle’’
to go from particular or individual action maxims or norms to
those which may legitimately be seen to apply to all; to be general
and universal.
Kant’s categorical imperative was just such a bridging principle
that aimed to exclude maxims that would succeed only if they
were not followed by all. But the problem with this is that it rests
on an individual person’s judgement as to whether everyone
would follow a norm after considering it consequences and side-ef-
fects; or alternatively that other people in a similar position would
come to the same conclusion. Surely, a genuinely universal norm
must be attested to not by a single individual but by the common
assent of all concerned? This in turn requires those involved to also
consider the interests of others – communicative action as opposed
to strategic action is based on mutual recognition and commit-
ments rather than threats or promises.
These considerations lead Habermas to propose what he calls
the universalization principle (U):
‘‘A norm is valid when the foreseeable consequences and side-
effects of its general observance for the interests and value-ori-
entations of each individual could be jointly accepted by all con-
cerned without coercion’’ (Habermas, 1999a, p. 42, orig.
emphasis).This is a very demanding test. The idea is that those affected (or
perhaps their representatives) will participate in a real debate in an
effort to resolve their differences. They should do so with the aim
of creating a common will by trying to genuinely place themselves
in the position of others, not simply by bargaining to an agreed
compromise. The references to interests and values recognise that
people will come with different pragmatic and ethical concerns
which have to be addressed. The reference to ‘‘without coercion’’
is extremely important as it points to Habermas’s concerns that
such discussions must be equal and fair, determined by ‘‘the force
of the better argument’’ rather than political or personal force
(Habermas, 1990, p. 89).
In order to ensure that this should happen, Habermas has sug-
gested certain rules or procedures that discourse should follow:
 All speakers are allowed equal participation.
 Everyone is allowed to:
– Question any assertion or claim;
– Introduce any assertion or claim;
– Express their own attitudes, desires or needs.
 No form of overt or covert coercion should deny the above right.
Originally, Habermas called this approach the ‘‘ideal speech sit-
uation’’ but because of misunderstandings now refers to it as an
‘‘unrestricted communication community’’ following ideas of Pei-
rce (1931–1958), Apel (1980) and Mead (1934).
We need to be clear about the status and justification of this
principle, and its relationship to a wider principle called the dis-
course principle (D) which underlies discourse ethics. Habermas
(1990, p. 76–96) argues that anyone who enters into a process of
argumentation with another person is implicitly accepting or
agreeing to procedural conditions that amount to accepting U. Part
of the argument is based on Apel (1980) notion of performativePlease cite this article in press as: Mingers, J. Ethics and OR: Operationalis
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a certain propositional content which is contradicted by the actu-
ality of the speech act. Thus, if a person actually says, ‘‘I am not
speaking at the moment’’ they contradict themselves by the very
act of speaking. Habermas shows that people who argue against
U, or the rules that go with it, generate performative contradictions
by the very fact of their arguing.
‘‘Demonstrating the existence of performative contradictions
helps to identify the rules necessary for any argumentation
game to work; if one is to argue at all there are no substitutes’’
(Habermas, 1990, p. 95).
We must now situate the universalization principle (or moral
principle), U, within Habermas;’ wider conception of discourse as
the way in which society regulates itself. We have seen that com-
munication is fundamental to the nature of human society and is
used routinely and in a taken-for-granted way to direct and orga-
nise our social interactions. But at times there will be disagreement
about speech acts and their validity claims and at this point ordin-
ary communication is suspended and a discourse about the com-
munication occurs. It is through this process of discourse or
argumentation that societal norms become established and agreed
upon (or not). These norms for action cover a wide range of situa-
tions and are not all of a strictly moral nature in the sense of being
universal – ethical and pragmatic questions also arise. But all of
these rely for their validation on what Habermas calls the dis-
course principle (D):
‘‘Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected
persons could agree as participants in rational discourses’’ (Hab-
ermas, 1996, p. 107, my emphasis).
Thus D represents a general procedure for agreeing (or other-
wise) the acceptability and validity of normative claims in general.
It is procedural – it does not generate any norms itself (other than
that of discourse) but provides a mechanism for testing the validity
of putative norms. Moreover, Habermas intends that such debates
will be real and actual, not hypothetical or theoretical, and they
will take place within a particular social context dealing with ac-
tual problems:
‘‘It would be utterly pointless to engage in a practical discourse
without a horizon provided by the lifeworld of a specific social
group and without real conflicts in a concrete situation in which
the actors consider it incumbent upon them to reach a consen-
sual means of regulating some controversial social matter’’
(Habermas, 1990, p. 103).
But D covers a wider range of issues than those that are strictly
moral ones, and D applies both to the formal systems of society
such as law and democracy, and the more informal discourses of
the lifeworld. In each case D needs to be restricted or interpreted
appropriately. For example, when applied to the law it refers to
those norms that are embodied in statutes; when applied to moral
issues that concern all, it utilises U; when applied in ethical con-
texts it can be limited to only those involved in a particular form
of life; and even in pragmatic contexts which tend to be based
on strategic action the principle can inform procedures such as col-
lective bargaining or dispute resolution (Habermas, 1996, p. 107).
We should elucidate the status of the ideal speech situation or
the unlimited communication community. First, as shown above,
Habermas claims that these presuppositions of argumentation
are in fact always already assumed by people who genuinely and
sincerely enter into discussion and debate for if any of them were
clearly not to be the case, e.g., relevant people were excluded from
a discussion, it would be obvious that the force of the better argu-
ment alone would not prevail.ing discourse ethics. European Journal of Operational Research (2010),
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part, freely and equally, in a cooperative search for truth, where
nothing coerces anyone except the force of the better argu-
ment’’ (Habermas, 1990, p. 198).
However, in practice these very exacting conditions will only
hold to a degree. There is not infinite time; not everyone will be
able to be present; not all necessary information will be known
or correct; everyone is not equally adept at arguing; and so on.
So from this perspective it is simply a regulative ideal towards
which real discourses can aspire and against which they can be
measured.
3.3. Applications of discourse ethics
At first sight DE would appear to be highly idealistic and of little
relevance to real-world situations but I will argue that in many
ways it is more practical than other ethical theories. In this section
I will describe several domains in which it has already been ap-
plied. We can begin by considering the law which is essentially a
system for generating and legitimating norms of behaviour for
society and organisations within it, and for then enforcing them.
What is the relationship between law and morality? We can get
a feel for this from the title of Habermas (1996) book dealing with
law – ‘‘Between Facts and Norms’’. Law has a dual aspect – on the
one hand it appears as a given; laws exist and govern social life,
they are like social facts. On the other hand, in order to function
they must rely on a degree of legitimacy with the people who must
feel they ought to obey them not simply because of their fear of
sanction. This is the normative aspect and this is where discourse
operates – valid or legitimate norms are those which gain peoples’
assent through processes of debate; through the discourse
principle.
However, the law is not identical with morality. Law has to reg-
ulate all spheres of social life (Habermas, 1996, Section 3.2); it has
to generate and operate legal norms that cover pragmatic conflicts
of interest which may involve strategic rather than communica-
tional action, and with protecting strong value-choices, as well as
with questions of justice. (The same may be said of the organisa-
tional world – decisions and actions have repercussions in all three
domains.) The law also has to ensure that its own workings are
themselves properly constituted in the sense of a system of rights
that ensures equal communicative participation for all. This leads
to a reformulation of the discourse principle into the democracy
principle: ‘‘Only those statutes can claim legitimacy that can meet
with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation
that in turn has been legally constituted’’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 110).
Each of the domains involves different reference groups and dif-
ferent discursive procedures. Moral questions are governed by con-
siderations of fairness for all and ultimately relate to the world
community. Moral norms can be justified through the universaliza-
tion principle (U) but there also needs to be discourse about their
application in particular situations. How does one judge which
norms apply or are appropriate in a particular real-world situation
(Habermas, 1993a, p. 37)? Ethical questions concern issues of self-
understanding of particular communities or forms of life and are
highly relevant to the multicultural societies that exist nowadays.
Pragmatic questions involve bargaining and negotiating fair com-
promises between competing interests. These ideas have informed
current debates within the realm of politics which go beyond the
concept of liberal democracy, as we have at the moment, towards
what is known as ‘‘deliberative democracy’’ (Dryzek, 2002; Gut-
man and Thompson, 1996, 2004; O’Flynn, 2006) which will be dis-
cussed later.
DE has also been employed within business ethics generally.
Reed (1999a,b) has suggested that the distinctions between legiti-Please cite this article in press as: Mingers, J. Ethics and OR: Operationalis
doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2010.11.003macy, morality and ethicality provide a more sophisticated and
comprehensive approach to dealing with the normative bases of
stakeholder claims; and that the underlying communicative theory
goes beyond the abstract notions of a Rawlsian veil of ignorance to-
wards actual debate and discourse, and a recognition of the reali-
ties of compromise and bargaining. Smith (2004) argues that
increasingly companies will not be able to achieve their long-term
strategic aims by acting in a purely instrumental, pragmatic man-
ner – but need to become engaged within the moral and commu-
nicative spheres of society as a whole. In a similar vein, Palazzo and
Scherer (2006) and Scherer and Palazzo (2007) argue that corpora-
tions need to become politicized in the sense that they need to be-
come genuinely political agents within an increasingly globalised,
‘‘postnational’’ (Habermas, 2001) world.4. Discourse ethics and operational research
In this section I shall argue that there are strong mutual connec-
tions between DE and OR. On the one hand, DE could provide a
rigorous and innovative framework for managing the ethical impli-
cations of ORwork, in linewith LeMenestrel and VanWassenhove’s
‘‘ethics beyond the model’’. However, as has been noted above and
by Ulrich (2006), discourse ethics as it stands is too utopian and ide-
alistic to be practicable and so needs to be operationalised or prag-
matised, and it is here that OR can make a contribution to DE.
I suggest that the positive features of DE are:
1. The idea of practical discourse. Unlike other ethical theories
which locate ethical practices either within the individual or
the community, DE envisages real, involved debate and dis-
course among those who will be affected by a proposal or deci-
sion. This resonates well with developments in soft and critical
OR.
2. The emphasis on universalism pushes us to sweep in and involve
as wide a range of stakeholders and affectees as possible. This
picks up on ideas of boundary critique and marginalisation
(Midgley, 2000; Ulrich, 1994b) which would seem to be of great
relevance in today’s fractured and divisive world.
3. That it is more comprehensive than other approaches. It recog-
nises that there are different types of issues – pragmatic, ethical
andmoral – which have correspondingly different means of res-
olution. And, it thereby acknowledges the concerns of conse-
quentialists over the efficacy and efficiency of outcomes, and
the concerns of communitarians in recognising the legitimacy
of particular, local practices or customs. In the long run, how-
ever, effective action requires the recognition of the just as well
as the good and the practical.
Against these positive features, there are, of course, limitations
and criticisms of discourse ethics. Criticism in the literature has
tended to focus on the assumptions that Habermas makes about
the nature of human judgement. In particular, that it is overly
rationalistic, universalistic and male. In other words, that it pre-
sumes that moral judgement is an intellectual and rational exercise
rather than one based on emotion or care for the other (Benhabib,
1992; Blaug, 2000; Gilligan, 1990).
However, I want to focus, from an OR viewpoint, on more prac-
tical concerns if DE is actually to become more than simply an
interesting idea. Discourse ethics, as it stands, is too unrealistic
in at least three ways: (i) in terms of involving and including all
those affected by actions and decisions; (ii) in terms of approxi-
mating the ideal speech situation or communicative community
that underpins and validates debate and discourse; and (iii) in
deciding the extent to which issues raise pragmatic, ethical or mor-
al imperatives. I will now discuss each of these in turn.ing discourse ethics. European Journal of Operational Research (2010),
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The fundamental tenet of deliberative democracy and discourse
ethics is that legitimacy and justice comes from the active involve-
ment of all relevant stakeholders in open and reflective delibera-
tion. By relevant stakeholders we mean all those groups of
people who will be significantly affected by the outcomes of a par-
ticular decision (or non-decision) whether they have a direct
involvement with the organisation or not. There are two problems
in applying this in an organisational context, whether it be in the
public or private sector – convincing the primary participants –
analysts and clients – to do it, and then gaining the effective
engagement of an appropriate range of stakeholders. The former
can be addressed both with generic arguments and with specific
methodologies such as Critical Systems Heuristics (CSH) (Ulrich,
1994b), boundary critique (Midgley, 2000) and critiquing validity
claims (Mingers, 2006, p. 251).
The general arguments concern the need for companies to be-
have, and be seen to behave, responsibly and ethically in the light
of the problems of sustainability and corporate irresponsibility of
so much concern today (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007). But it is not
just a question of forcing companies to behave in this way, it is also
arguably in the corporation’s own long term interests given the rise
of ethical consumerism and the necessity of engaging authentically
with the wider civil society (Ozanne, 2009).
The specific contribution of OR is methods that focus on the
boundary-drawing process in practical projects. All projects have
to be delimited in some way but how those boundaries are drawn
in terms of what aspects of the problem(s) are included; over what
timescale; and, crucially, involving which stakeholders, places
immediate limits on the extent of ethical discourse. The point to
emphasise, made originally by Churchman (1970, p. 43) is that
decisions about boundaries are never simply technical or neutral
but are always value- or interest-based. This means that they will
often need to be tested and challenged in order to encompass
unrepresented groups or longer timescales. CSH, which was actu-
ally developed in part from the theories of Kant and Habermas, in-
volves 12 critical questions which are answered in both the ‘‘is’’
and the ‘‘ought’’ mode. These cover issues such as the client, the
decision-maker, witnesses on behalf of the affected but unin-
volved, and sources of knowledge and expertise.
Midgley’s work focuses mainly on those groups who are in-
cluded (the ‘‘sacred’’) and those who are excluded (the ‘‘profane’’)
in relation to particular boundary judgements. Mingers’ approach
involves four forms of critique – a critique of rhetoric, i.e., how
the proposals are presented; a critique of tradition – not taking
for granted the conventional wisdom; a critique of authority –
questioning the views and interests of the powerful; and a critique
of objectivity – questioning the knowledge and information
available.
The second problem concerns gaining effective involvement
from a range of stakeholders. There are already several methods
for trying to facilitate this (Ozanne, 2009), for example: citizen’s ju-
ries (Crosby and Nethercut, 2005) where a representative sample
of those concerned convene together for a day or more to discuss
a well-defined issue, and can call experts or witnesses; consensus
conferences (Hendriks, 2005) where a panel of ordinary citizens
are convened in public on a specific controversial topic. They inter-
rogate experts and then set the agenda for discussion meetings
with the aim of achieving a consensus. Or a deliberative focus
group where a specific group, e.g., the visually-impaired, are con-
vened to air their views on a specific topic.
Soft OR and group decision support methods can obviously also
be used in this way. Examples here would include Nominal Group
Technique (NGT), Team Syntegrity (Beer, 1994) and a range of
other large-group interaction methods (Bryson and Anderson,Please cite this article in press as: Mingers, J. Ethics and OR: Operationalis
doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2010.11.0032000) such as Future Search, Open Space Technology, Strategic Op-
tions Development and Analysis (SODA). Many of these do more
than simply involve participants, they also provide various ways
of helping to structure thinking and debate which will be discussed
further in the next section. Another recent approach to complex,
multi-sectorial problems is that of Wiek and Walter (2009) called
Transdisciplinary Integrated Planning and Synthesis. This utilises
soft OR methods within a multimethodology framework to meet
the needs and requests of all stakeholders including amongst these
NGOs and citizens. There has also been a recent special issue of
Systemic Practice and Action Research devoted to collaboration
and participation (Newig et al., 2008).
4.2. Realising the ideal speech situation
Getting involvement is important but is not enough to ensure
valid outcomes. Habermas sets up the notion of the ideal speech
situation to try and ensure everyone is able to participate in the
deliberations on a completely equal footing and that the argu-
ments themselves should ‘‘win the day’’.
The ultimate aim is to generate a ‘‘common will’’ rather than
simply an accommodation of competing interests by genuinely try-
ing to take on and understand the position of others (Habermas,
1999a). Although Habermas generally talks about outcomes that
are ‘‘equally’’ good for all, it may well be that in practice agreement
will coalesce around outcomes that are ‘‘sufficiently’’ good for all,
i.e., that meet their minimal requirements if not their optimal ones.
This clearly has many resonances with the aims of soft OR and
problem structuring methods (Rosenhead and Mingers, 2001)
methods such as Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) (Checkland
and Poulter, 2006) and cognitive mapping (Bryson et al., 2004) as
well as GDSS systems based around computerised voting. All these
approaches would accept the above points although in practice
there may be limits to that which I will mention below. But they
go further in offering processes and devices to try and guide and
structure the discussions.
 Models All these OR methods include a variety of forms of
explicit models, generally pictorial rather than mathematical,
to help participants express and explore their own and others
ideas. Examples are: rich pictures, cognitive maps, influence
diagrams and conceptual models. The point of these is that
often people find it hard to fully articulate their own thought
on a complex issue, let alone appreciate someone else’s posi-
tion. Expressing them openly, especially in easy to understand
pictorial form, generates a greater degree of enlightenment
and change of view.
 Facilitation Many of these methodologies use a facilitator to
guide the process. This can be extremely important in ensuring
that aspects of the ideal speech situation are realised, for exam-
ple reducing the dominance of particular individuals through
their position or force of personality and correspondingly
enhancing the impact of those less able to articulate their views
for whatever reason (Wiek, 2007).
 Structured process All the methods have their own particular
processes to shape the discussions in effective ways. To mention
just a few: SSM develops logical conceptual models, often
embodying competing viewpoints, which are then counter-
posed with each other and with the actual situation. Strategic
Assumption Surfacing and Testing (SAST) (Mason and Mitroff,
1981) forms groups of participants that are most diametrically
opposed to each other in order to contrast and explore the often
hidden assumptions underlying particular viewpoints. Team
Syntegrity (Beer, 1994) has a sophisticated system of interlock-
ing groups of participants so that ideas developed in one group
can quickly inform all the other groups.ing discourse ethics. European Journal of Operational Research (2010),
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ation is that some people may feel constrained about expressing
their true opinions because of the other people present. One
way round this is to use computer-assisted group decision sup-
port systems where responses, e.g., votes, can be registered
anonymously (Ackerman and Eden, 2001). Such systems also
allow access to large amounts of information on screens, and
can also be used to facilitate large virtual groups.
Although no studies have yet been done to test this, it does
seem to me that the above techniques could all potentially help
to realise at least some aspects of an ideal speech situation.4.3. Recognising ethical and moral issues
The third difficulty with DE mentioned above, is trying to decide
the extent to which particular issues or decisions actually involve
moral and ethical concerns, rather than merely pragmatic ones.
Many OR problems, particularly tactical ones within organisations,
tend to be seen initially as pragmatic questions of efficient means
to agreed ends that do not raise wider concerns. Other problems,
especially those in the public sector or involving complex societal
issues (DeTombe, 2002) are recognised as ethical from the start. An
interesting current example of a complex social issue is bioethics,
that is all the ethical issues raised by developments in biology
and genetics that can affect the body and health. France is cur-
rently holding a national consultation, based on principles of delib-
eration, about bioethics called États Généraux de la bioéthique
(Picavet, 2009).
In the case of the more straightforward OR problems, one might
adopt the practice of assuming that it is simply a pragmatic issue
unless or until someone raises ethical or moral concerns. This is
actually, to some extent, how Habermas himself visualises the pro-
cess occurring (Habermas, 1996, p. 164). However, I would argue,
as I have done in the context of multimethodology which raises
similar concerns, that all issues have the potential for ethical and
moral dimensions and therefore it is better to at least consider
these from the start. In other words, at the beginning of a project,
as part of scoping and boundary-setting (see above), all those who
may potentially be affected by the project should be thought of
and, if necessary, asked for their views, or at the very least have
their possible viewpoint on the matter considered.
This approach might be seen as unrealistic and one could argue
that organisational (and societal) change will always have winners
and losers. So, it is perhaps worth drawing a distinction between
interests and values. Discourse ethics is concerned primarily with
values, that is, what is considered to be right or wrong, fair or good.
That is different from a person’s or group’s interests which concern
their (often economic) advantage or disadvantage. Thus a course ofTable 1
Relations between OR methods and the domains of discourse ethics.






Material world Pragmatic Efficacy (does it
work?)
Issues that can be a
means that achieve
physical or social
Personal world Ethical Ethicality (is it good
for the individual or
group?)
Issues where people
over their values an
Social world Moral Equity (is it fair and
just?)
Issues that affect ma
solutions that all ca
The ‘‘real’’ world of
organisations
Legitimacy Effectiveness In practice, these iss
occur together. Law
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people but that does not mean that it is necessarily immoral or
unethical provided it is done in a fair and justifiable way. Making
such difficult decisions through an open, deliberative procedure
such as DE will improve their legitimacy even though people will
still be disadvantaged in the end.4.4. Discourse ethics and OR
At the start of the paper it was suggested that OR should have a
close connection to ethical action and I hope that I have by now
shown that this is indeed the case. OR is not just the science of bet-
ter, but also the science of the good and the just.
How then should we apply DE to OR? Clearly this is not a simple
procedure that can be laid down in a code or a set of steps. All pro-
jects will potentially have ethical and moral aspects and it has to
be up to the OR practitioner, who is the driver of a project, to en-
sure that such matters are always considered. In some cases such
issues will be clear from the start, whilst in others they may only
emerge as the project progresses; what is important is that they
are not ignored or sidelined and that every effort is made to involve
and engage all the relevant stakeholders in a genuine and contin-
uing dialogue.
But we also have to be realistic. Habermas accepts (Habermas,
1996, p. 164), at the level of society, that the law has to deal with
all three types of issues and that at times situations will be driven
by strategic action or bargaining and even conflict. DE does not put
itself forward as a panacea but it does provide a processual tem-
plate against which proposals and decisions can be tested for eth-
ical legitimacy, and, if followed, should lead to actions that are
better in the long run for both organisations and civil society as a
whole.
OR relates to DE not just procedurally, in terms of making DE
more practicable and operational, but also substantively in
addressing the practical, ethical and moral domains. Table 1 tries
to show these relations. The first three rows of the Table show
the domains of the pragmatic, ethical and moral, respectively and
how OR methods and methodologies can contribute to these. The
relationship of the OR methods to the three domains has not been
explicitly developed and justified in this paper, which has been pri-
marily concerned with the ethical dimension, but the relationships
to Habermas’s three worlds has been demonstrated in several ear-
lier papers (Jackson, 1985, 1990; Mingers, 1992a, 1997a, 2003).
I have also included the idea of legitimacy in this Table, which
was briefly introduced in Section 3. For Habermas, legitimacy is
distinct from, and encompassing of, morality and ethics (Haber-
mas, 1996). The law has a need to establish its legitimacy, that is
its acceptability by the people who are governed. But the law has
to deal with more than just moral issues – it has to regulate allOR contribution
ddressed in terms of efficacy –
agreed ends or goals. Could be
Traditional OR which can help by finding
better solutions to practical problems
or groups may genuinely differ
d such differences can be accepted
Soft OR, e.g., cognitive mapping, SSM,
MCDA, Web2.0 to explore and recognise
differences
ny people where there is a need for
n agree with
Soft OR, GSS, CSH, critical systems, TSI to
recognise and alleviate barriers to open
discourse
ues are not separable and will often
and business must cope with all
Multimethodology – combining the
different approaches together
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putes and pragmatic clashes of interest. It has, in other words, to be
able to deal with all three domains. I am arguing that the same is
true in the organisational world where all of these types of issues
come together and need to be resolved effectively, in a way that in-
cludes efficiency, ethicality and equity.
The need for legitimacy ties into wider debates about the role of
science and technology (and knowledge more generally) in devel-
oping a sustainable future. Cash et al. (2003) have studied both
successful and unsuccessful examples and conclude that scientific
information needs to be credible, salient and legitimate to be suc-
cessful in influencing policy. By legitimate they mean: ‘‘the percep-
tion that the production of information and technology has been
respectful of stakeholders’ divergent values and beliefs, unbiased
in its conduct, and fair in its treatment of opposing views and inter-
ests’’ (p. 8086). This is very much in line with our use of the term to
include moral, ethical and practical questions. Cash, Clark et al. also
draw attention to the very important question of boundaries, both
between different interest groups, and between experts and deci-
sion-makers, which was explored in Section 4.1.
4.5. Limitations and weaknesses
We must recognise that deliberative processes are not a magic
bullet but still have many practical limitations:
 Power Those in power may still be able to manipulate the out-
comes of deliberative processes through agenda setting, bound-
ary fixing, limiting resources and information, or choice of
experts. It could be argued that this makes the situation even
worse as it gives the appearance of legitimacy to what is actu-
ally a strategic process.
 Engagement and inclusion Creating deliberative spaces does
not of itself ensure that they will be properly utilised, especially
with marginalised groups. People may not wish to join in such a
process, and if they do they may well be in a disadvantaged
position with respect to those more privileged and better-edu-
cated. Cultural capital will always work in favour of the domi-
nant groups.
 Reasoned debate DE is grounded in reasoned debate and argu-
ment and a weighing of different viewpoints. But this is a very
Western, intellectual tradition that favours those who have had
an advanced education or have good rhetorical skills. Some
groups, particularly marginalised groups, may well express
their views in more emotive ways especially where it concerns
their living or livelihood.
 Time Clearly time will always be a constraint on the discourse
process. For Habermas, and Peirce on whom he drew, truth
and moral rightness are the outcomes of a potentially infinitely
debate but both recognise that this is simply a regulative ideal.
In practice, time will always be limited and it will be up to those
engaged in the discourse to judge whether a sufficient consen-
sus has been reached on all, or perhaps just some, of the issues
at hand.
 Debate and action Even supposing that an effective delibera-
tion has occurred will that necessarily lead to action? Or may
it just be a talking-shop which actually supplants really engag-
ing with a difficult problem and taking action.
5. Conclusions
OR practitioners generally work for and on behalf of large
organisations and corporations advising them on what actions they
ought to take. In the past OR has largely ignored difficult ethical
questions on the grounds that it was only serving the needs of
its clients. However, we currently face an uniquely disturbing situ-Please cite this article in press as: Mingers, J. Ethics and OR: Operationalis
doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2010.11.003ation in which corporations often have more power and influence
than nation states; there have been serious breaches in corporate
responsibility; and we are in danger of destroying ourselves eco-
nomically or environmentally. In these circumstances it is impera-
tive that we consider the ethical and moral implications of our
policy recommendations.
There are many approaches to ethics – codes of practice, deon-
tology, communitarian and so on – but this paper has explored a
relatively recent and innovative process called discourse ethics.
This is unique in taking ethical decisions away from individuals
or committees and putting them in the hands of the actual people
who are involved through processes of debate and deliberation.
The paper has argued that in fact discourse ethics has strong con-
nections to OR, especially in the areas of soft and critical systems.
These methods can actually contribute to the practical implemen-
tation of DE while art the same time DE can provide a rigorous dis-
cursive framework for ‘‘ethics beyond the model’’. This does not
mean that discourse ethics is not without its problems and limita-
tions, but at a political level there is considerable practical interest
in forms of deliberative democracy and this should encourage us to
try operationalising DE within OR.
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